Introduction

1.
The United States appeals certain issues of law and legal interpretations in the Panel Report,
United States -Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Bismuth Carbon
Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (the "Panel Report"). 1 The Panel was established to consider a complaint by the European Communities with respect to countervailing duties imposed by the United States on certain hot-rolled lead and bismuth carbon steel products ("leaded bars") originating in the United Kingdom.
2.
The alleged subsidies countervailed relate principally to equity infusions granted by the British Government to a state-owned company, British Steel Corporation ("BSC"), between 1977 and 1986. 2 In 1986, BSC and Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds ("GKN"), a privately-owned company, created United Engineering Steels Limited ("UES") as a joint venture. Both BSC and GKN provided assets to UES, in return for equal shares in the joint venture. In particular, BSC spun-off its leaded bar-producing assets to UES. Negotiations concerning the spin-off were conducted at arm's length, consistent with commercial considerations. BSC ceased producing leaded bars after the spin-off of its leaded bar-producing assets to UES. 3 In preparation for the privatization of BSC, British Steel plc ("BSplc") assumed, in September 1988, the property, rights and liabilities of BSC, including BSC's WT/DS138/AB/R Page 3
The Panel recommended that the United States bring its measures into conformity with the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the " SCM Agreement"). 
Procedures").
On 7 February 2000, the United States filed its appellant's submission.
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On 21 February 2000, the European Communities filed its appellee's submission. 16 On the same day, Brazil and Mexico each filed a third participant's submission. Procedures, and in the interests of fairness and orderly procedure in the conduct of this appeal, to hold another oral hearing on 4 April 2000. On that date, the participants and third participants presented oral arguments and responded to questions put to them by the Members of the newly-constituted Division. Due to these same extraordinary circumstances, the participants in this appeal, the European Communities and the United States, agreed to a two week extension of the 90-day time limit for the consideration of this appeal, and thus agreed that this Report should be circulated no later than 10 May 2000. 
II. Arguments of the Participants and Third Participants
A. 
Claims of Error by the United
11.
The United States appeals two principal findings made by the Panel. First, the United States argues that the Panel erred in finding that, in its review proceedings, the USDOC should have examined the continued existence of a benefit to UES and BSplc/BSES. Second, the United States challenges, on both substantive and procedural grounds, the Panel's finding that UES and BSplc/BSES received no benefit from the subsidies granted to BSC.
12.
The United States argues that the ordinary meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, read in the light of its context and the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement, confirms that the benefit of a subsidy is determined as of the time of bestowal. The requisite financial contribution and benefit are described by Article 1.1 in the present tense. Thus, the benefit is created by the terms on which the financial contribution is made, and arises at the same time the financial contribution is made. The United States argues that i f WTO Members were required to conduct an "ongoing demonstration" that the original benefit still constitutes an advantage to the relevant company, it would become "nearly impossible" to administer countervailing duty laws. describes how an investigating authority should measure the benefit of subsidies, looks only to the time of the subsidy bestowal, and not to any subsequent point in time. The United States also argues that the wording of Article 27.13 strongly implies a general rule that subsidies bestowed on a government-owned company prior to privatization are actionable after privatization.
14.
In the view of the United States, the provisions relied on by the Panel as evidence that a benefit must be demonstrated again after a change in ownership -Articles 10, 19.1, 19.4 and 21.1 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 -do not provide guidance on this issue.
Finally, the United States notes that the practice of investigating authorities in the European
Communities confirms that there is no need to re-evaluate a subsidy's benefit after it is bestowed.
15.
With respect to the Panel's finding that UES and BSplc/BSES received no benefit, the United States asserts that the Panel engaged in a flawed analysis that led directly to its erroneous conclusion that pre-privatization subsidies are automatically "extinguished" when a subsidized company is sold for fair market value. According to the United States, the Panel first found that the USDOC must establish that the company that produced or exported the relevant products "personally received" the benefit. Then, the Panel decided that the successor, privatized company was not the same company as the predecessor, government-owned company because the two companies had different owners. The Panel then asked itself whether the privatization transaction itself conferred a benefit on the post-privatization company. The United States argues that this analysis confuses old subsidies and new subsidies, and wrongly switches the focus from the company that received the subsidy to its new owners. According to the United States, whether a privatization transaction confers a "new" subsidy is unrelated to whether the transaction eliminates the unamortized portion of "old" subsidies.
19 Panel Report, WT/DS126/RW, adopted 11 February 2000.
16.
In the view of the United States, the SCM Agreement provides that subsidies are bestowed upon production. Since a mere change in ownership does not have an automatic or immediate effect upon production which has benefitted from subsidies, there is no basis in the Agreement for the Panel's conclusion that the purchase of a subsidized company for fair market value automatically extracts the benefit of that subsidy from the production of that company. Rather, Article 10 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 make clear that it is a company's productive operations that are relevant to the determination of whether a subsidy exists under the investigating authority must in all cases examine the existence of benefit during the period of investigation, and cannot irrebuttably presume that a benefit conferred some time in the past continues. 
The European Communities argues that the
The European Communities requests the Appellate Body to uphold the Panel's rejection of the
United States' argument that untied subsidies become "embedded" in a company and its production.
As the Panel held, and consistent with the Appellate Body Report in Canada -Aircraft 27 , financial contributions benefit the act of production, manufacture or export and provide an advantage to business enterprises. The European Communities thus submits that financial contributions are received and enjoyed by legal persons, not inanimate objects.
27.
The European Communities also submits that the Panel properly rejected the United States'
claim that countervailing duties may be imposed on the basis of market distortions. This attempt to justify the use of countervailing duties to correct alleged market distortions is contradicted by the provisions of the USDOC's own General Issues Appendix, which the USDOC claims represents its 26 United States' appellant's submission, para. 56. to resolve the dispute. This is a flawed notion of judicial economy. In fact, the European Communities asserts, a panel has a broad discretion to determine which claims, properly before it, need to be addressed in order to achieve appropriate resolution of a dispute.
28 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997. 29 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 6 November 1998. 30 European Communities' appellee's submission, para. 128.
C.
Arguments by the Third Participants 
31.
Brazil submits that the Panel correctly determined that the text of the SCM Agreement, and, in particular, Articles 1, 10, 19 and 21, requires a "current benefit determination", that is, a determination that a benefit exists during the period of investigation or review. The SCM Agreement, like the Anti-Dumping Agreement, has a "structural bias" against the application of presumptions over time, and instead contemplates the consideration of all relevant and current information in making findings. Brazil believes that this "bias" is evidenced by the requirement for regular reviews. In this context, the United States' insistence that it can determine the existence of a benefit at one point in time, and then presume that nothing other than amortization can affect the benefit over a period of fifteen to twenty years, is "unacceptable". Brazil also doubts the relevance of Article 27.13 of the SCM Agreement to this issue, and adds that, to the extent that it is relevant, Article 27.13 does not support the United States' position.
32.
Brazil further contends that the Panel correctly rejected the United States' position that a benefit determination can be made without regard to the identity of a company's owners. As the Panel found, any benefit analysis under the SCM Agreement must consider whether there is a benefit to the owners of a company, since the ultimate beneficiary of a countervailable subsidy is the owner of the company at the time the subsidy is conferred. If a new owner has paid market value for an asset or an ownership interest in the asset, then the benefit remains with the original owner of the asset or the ownership interest. Thus, Brazil concludes, the Panel correctly rejected the position that the USDOC is free to disregard the owners of a company and their relationship to the company's assets in determining whether there is a countervailable benefit. Finally, as regards the United States'
arguments on market distortion, Brazil stresses that the SCM Agreement does not broadly authorize
Members to redress any actions they might feel distort the market. Rather, the SCM Agreement allows a Member to apply countervailing duties to the products of a particular company, during a particular period, only after certain conditions are met. Mexico notes that, since the Declaration is not one of the "special or additional rules and procedures" listed in Appendix 2 of the DSU, Article 1.1 of the DSU must apply.
35.
Mexico requests the Appellate Body to confirm the Panel's finding of a requirement that the benefit be calculated before and after a company has been privatised, as well as the finding that the USDOC violated Article 10 of the SCM Agreement by not showing that a subsidy had been bestowed on the imports for each year reviewed. Mexico believes that the United States' arguments, if accepted, would lead to an absurd result -that a benefit follows the enterprise that received a subsidy ad infinitum. On such a view, countervailing duties could legitimately be applied to that enterprise even after it had been privatized and all or most of its market value paid. The United States relies on the difficulty of quantifying a benefit and on its "perpetual benefit theory", but ignores the fact that an investigating authority is obliged, by the wording of Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994, to calculate the way in which the amount paid for a company affects the benefit. The United States is also wrong to imply that Article 21.1 of the SCM Agreement merely suggests that the subsidy must occur before the injury. Rather, Mexico argues, Article 21 makes clear that an investigating authority, in reviewing the need for the continued imposition of the duty, must terminate the duties when the injury, or the subsidy causing the injury, disappears.
31 Appellate Body Report, WT/DS60/AB/R, adopted 25 November 1998, para. 64. However, Article 17.9 of the DSU provides:
III. Preliminary Procedural Matter
Working procedures shall be drawn up by the Appellate Body in consultation with the Chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the Members for their information.
This provision makes clear that the Appellate Body has broad authority to adopt procedural rules which do not conflict with any rules and procedures in the DSU or the covered agreements.
33
Therefore, we are of the opinion that as long as we act consistently with the provisions of the DSU and the covered agreements, we have the legal authority to decide whether or not to accept and consider any information that we believe is pertinent and useful in an appeal.
40.
We wish to emphasize that in the dispute settlement system of the WTO, the DSU envisages We are of the opinion that we have the legal authority under the DSU to accept and consider amicus curiae briefs in an appeal in which we find it pertinent and useful to do so. In this appeal, we have not found it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs filed into account in rendering our decision.
IV. Issues Raised in This Appeal
43.
The following issues are raised in this appeal:
(a) whether the Panel erred in applying to this dispute the standard of review set forth in Article 11 of the DSU, rather than the standard set forth in Article 17.6 of the
Anti-Dumping Agreement;
(b) whether the Panel erred in finding that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the USDOC should have examined in its 1995, 1996 and 1997 administrative reviews whether a "benefit" accrued to UES and BSplc/BSES following the changes in ownership; and (c) whether the Panel erred in finding that no "benefit" was conferred on UES or BSplc/BSES as a result of the "financial contributions" made to BSC. 
V. Standard of Review
The United States argues that the Panel erred in applying the standard of review set forth in
Article 11 of the DSU, rather than the standard of review set forth in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
45.
To determine the standard of review that applies in disputes involving countervailing duty measures under Part V of the SCM Agreement, we begin with Article 1 of the DSU, which provides, in relevant part:
1. The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply to disputes brought pursuant to the consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in Appendix 1 to this Understanding (referred to in this Understanding as the "covered agreements"). …
2.
The rules and procedures of this Understanding shall apply subject to such special or additional rules and procedures on dispute settlement contained in the covered agreements as are identified in Appendix 2 to this Understanding. … We also note that Article 30 of the SCM Agreement specifies:
The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding shall apply to consultations and the settlement of disputes under this Agreement, except as otherwise specifically provided herein.
We further note that the SCM Ag reement does not contain any "special or additional rules" on the standard of review to be applied by panels.
46.
We recall that, in our Report 
49.
We consider this argument to be without merit. By its own terms, the Declaration does not impose an obligation to apply the standard of review contained in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to disputes involving countervailing duty measures under Part V of the SCM Agreement. The Declaration is couched in hortatory language; it uses the words "Ministers recognize". Furthermore, the Declaration merely acknowledges "the need for the consistent resolution of disputes arising from anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures." It does not specify any specific action to be taken. In particular, it does not prescribe a standard of review to be applied.
Furthermore, the Decision on Review of Article 17.6 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (the "Decision") provides:
The standard of review in paragraph 6 of Article 17 of the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of GATT 1994 shall be reviewed after a period of three years with a view to considering the question of whether it is capable of general application.
This Decision provides for review of the standard of review in Article 17.6 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement to determine if it is "capable of general application" to other covered agreements, including the SCM Agreement. By implication, this Decision supports our conclusion that the Article 17.6 standard applies only to disputes arising under the Anti-Dumping Agreement, and not to disputes arising under other covered agreements, such as the SCM Agreement. To date, the DSB has not conducted the review contemplated in this Decision.
51.
We, therefore, conclude that the Panel was correct in applying the standard of review set forth in Article 11 of the DSU to this dispute arising under Part V of the SCM Agreement. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel found:
… the USDOC should have examined the continued existence of "benefit" already deemed to have been conferred by the pre-1985/86 "financial contributions" to BSC, and it should have done so from the perspective of UES and BSplc/BSES respectively, and not BSC.
41
… 39 We note the argument by the United States that "under any standard of review" the Panel could not come to the conclusion that the United States has violated its obligations under the SCM Agreement because that Agreement simply does not address the issues that were before the Panel. This argument is dealt with in the following section of our Report. 40 Panel Report, para. 6.86.
… fair market value was paid for all productive assets, goodwill etc. employed by UES and BSplc/BSES in the production of leaded bars imported into the United States in 1994, 1995 and 1996 . In these circumstances, we fail to see how pre-1985/86 "financial contributions" bestowed on BSC could subsequently be considered to confer a "benefit" on UES and BSplc/BSES during the relevant periods of review.
42
The United States appeals the above findings of the Panel. reviews, but that the applicable provision covering administrative reviews is Article 21, which provides in paragraph 2:
The authorities shall review the need for the continued imposition of the duty, where warranted, on their own initiative or, provided that a reasonable period of time has elapsed since the imposition of the definitive countervailing duty, upon request by any interested party which submits positive information substantiating the need for a review. Interested parties shall have the right to request the authorities to examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset subsidization, whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied, or both. If, as a result of the review under this paragraph, the authorities determine that the countervailing duty is no longer warranted, it shall be terminated immediately.
Pursuant to this paragraph, the authorities of a Member applying a countervailing duty must, where warranted, "review the need for the continued imposition of the duty". In carrying out such a review, the authorities must "examine whether the continued imposition of the duty is necessary to offset subsidization" and/or "whether the injury would be likely to continue or recur if the duty were removed or varied". Article 21.2 provides a review mechanism to ensure that Members comply with the rule set out in Article 21.1 of the SCM Agreement, which stipulates:
A countervailing duty shall remain in force only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract subsidization which is causing injury.
42 Panel Report, para. 6.81. 43 United States' appellant's submission, paras. 28-91.
54.
Setting aside the issue of injury, which does not arise in this case, we note that in order to establish the continued need for countervailing duties, an investigating authority will have to make a finding on subsidization, i.e., whether or not the subsidy continues to exist. If there is no longer a subsidy, there would no longer be any need for a countervailing duty.
55. Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement defines a "subsidy" as follows:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member … and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.
The existence of a "financial contribution" is not at issue in this appeal. The principal issue in this appeal concerns the interpretation of the term "benefit" in Article 1.1 above.
56.
The United States argues, on the basis of footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994, that the relevant "benefit" is a benefit to a company's productive operations, rather than, as the Panel held, a benefit to legal or natural persons. 44 It is true, as the United States emphasizes, that footnote 36 to Article 10 of the SCM Agreement and Article VI:3 of the GATT 1994 both refer to subsidies bestowed or granted directly or indirectly "upon the manufacture, production or export of any merchandise". In our view, however, it does not necessarily follow from this wording that the "benefit" referred to in Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement is a benefit to productive operations.
57.
In our Report in Canada -Aircraft, we stated, with regard to the term "benefit" in Article 1.1(b):
A "benefit" does not exist in the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a beneficiary or a recipient. Logically, a "benefit" can be said to arise only if a person, natural or legal, or a group of persons, has in fact received something. The term "benefit", therefore, implies that there must be a recipient. … 45 44 United States' appellant's submission, paras. 38-40.
45 Supra, footnote 25, para. 154. This statement was made in the context of our consideration in that appeal of the issue of whether a "benefit" is measured by the cost to government or the advantage conferred on the recipient. However, this does not affect the relevance of this statement regarding the meaning of the term "benefit" in Article 1.1 (b) of the SCM Agreement.
We find support for this reading in Article 14 of the SCM Agreement, which constitutes context for the interpretation of "benefit" in Article 1.1(b). Article 14 reads, in relevant part:
Calculation of the Amount of a Subsidy in Terms of the Benefit to the Recipient
For the purpose of Part V, any method used by the i nvestigating authority to calculate the benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1 shall be provided for in the national legislation or implementing regulations of the Member concerned and its application to each particular case shall be transparent and adequately explained. … Article 14 refers to the calculation of the "benefit to the recipient conferred pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 1" (emphasis added). As we reasoned in our Report in Canada -Aircraft:
This explicit textual reference to Article 1.1 in Article 14 indicates to us that "benefit" is used in the same sense in Article 14 as it is in Article 1.1. Therefore, the reference to "benefit to the recipient" in Article 14 also implies that the word "benefit", as used in Article 1.1, is concerned with the "benefit to the recipient" ... … in order to determine whether any subsidy was bestowed on the production by UES and BSplc/BSES respectively of leaded bars imported into the United States in 1994 States in , 1995 States in and 1996 , it is necessary to determine whether there was any "benefit" to UES and BSplc respectively (i.e., the producers of the imported leaded bars at issue).
48
59. The United States also appeals the Panel's finding that the investigating authority must demonstrate the existence, during the relevant period of investigation or review, of a continued "benefit" from a prior "financial contribution". 49 The United States argues that the use of the present tense of the verb "is conferred" in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement shows that an investigating authority must demonstrate the existence of "benefit" only at the time the "financial contribution" was 60. Article 1.1 sets out the definition of a subsidy for the purposes of the SCM Agreement.
However, Article 1.1 does not address the time at which the "financial contribution" and/or the "benefit" must be shown to exist. We therefore consider that Article 1.1 does not provide a basis for the argument made by the United States. We also find nothing in Articles 14 or 27.13 of the SCM Agreement that supports the United States' position.
61.
We have already stated that in a case involving countervailing duties imposed as a result of an administrative review, Articles 21.1 and 21.2 of the SCM Agreement are relevant. As discussed above, Article 21.1 allows Members to apply countervailing duties "only as long as and to the extent necessary to counteract subsidization … ". Article 21.2 sets out a review mechanism to ensure that Members comply with this rule. In an administrative review pursuant to Article 21.2, the investigating authority may be presented with "positive information" that the "financial contribution"
has been repaid or withdrawn and/or that the "benefit" no longer accrues. On the basis of its assessment of the information presented to it by interested parties, as well as of other evidence before it relating to the period of review, the investigating authority must determine whether there is a continuing need for the application of countervailing duties. The investigating authority is not free to ignore such information. If it were free to ignore this information, the review mechanism under Article 21.2 would have no purpose.
62.
Therefore, we agree with the Panel that while an investigating authority may presume, in the context of an administrative review under Article 21.2, that a "benefit" continues to flow from an untied, non-recurring "financial contribution", this presumption can never be "irrebuttable". 50 In this case, given the changes in ownership leading to the creation of UES and BSplc/BSES, the USDOC was required under Article 21.2 to examine, on the basis of the information before it relating to these changes, whether a "benefit" accrued to UES and BSplc/BSES. We thus agree with the Panel's finding that:
… the changes in ownership leading to the creation of UES and BSplc/BSES should have caused the USDOC to examine whether the production of leaded bars by UES and BSplc/BSES respectively, and not BSC, was subsidized. In particular, the USDOC should have examined the continued existence of "benefit" already deemed to have been conferred by the pre-1985/86 "financial contributions" to BSC, and it should have done so from the perspective of UES and BSplc/BSES respectively, and not BSC. … when an investigation or review takes place, the investigating authority must establish the existence of a "financial contribution" and "benefit" during the relevant period of investigation or review. Only then will that investigating authority be able to conclude, to the satisfaction of Article 1.1 (and Article 21), that there is a "financial contribution", and that a "benefit" is thereby conferred.
52
We do not agree with the Panel's implied view that, in the context of an administrative review under Article 21.2, an investigating authority must always establish the existence of a "benefit" during the period of review in the same way as an investigating authority must establish a "benefit" in an original investigation. We believe that it is important to distinguish between the original investigation leading to the imposition of countervailing duties and the administrative review. In an original investigation, the investigating authority must establish that all conditions set out in the SCM Agreement for the imposition of countervailing duties are fulfilled. In an administrative review, however, the investigating authority must address those issues which have been raised before it by the interested parties or, in the case of an investigation conducted on its own initiative, those issues which warranted the examination.
64.
Having found that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the USDOC, in its 1995, 1996 and 1997 administrative reviews, should have examined the continued existence of a "benefit" to UES and BSplc/BSES, the Panel subsequently examined whether the "financial contributions" bestowed on BSC between 1977 and 1986 could be considered to confer a "benefit" on UES and BSplc/BSES.
The Panel found that:
… fair market value was paid for all productive assets, goodwill etc. employed by UES and BSplc/BSES in the production of leaded bars imported into the United States in 1994 States in , 1995 States in and 1996 . In these circumstances, we fail to see how pre-1985/86 "financial contributions" bestowed on BSC could subsequently be considered to confer a "benefit" on UES and BSplc/BSES during the relevant periods of review.
53
The United States also appeals this finding.
52 Ibid., para. 6.73. 53 Panel Report, para. 6.81.
65.
In examining this issue, we note that, according to the Panel:
The United States has not denied that the BSC spin-off was negotiated for fair market value. 54 and that:
Both parties agree that the privatization of British Steel plc was "at arm's length, for fair market value and consistent with commercial considerations".
55
However, the United States, in its appellant's submission, argued that the Panel engaged " in a de novo review" and made factual findings "not adequately supported by the record" by finding "that the purchase price in each of the two BSC privatization transactions was a 'fair market value' purchase price".
56
66.
During the oral hearing of 13 March, the United States acknowledged that the Panel's findings that fair market value was paid for all productive assets, were factual findings. The United States also acknowledged during the oral hearing that it does not challenge these factual findings. In view of the United States' acknowledgement, we consider that the issue raised in its appellant's submission has become moot. For the same reason, the contention of the European Communities that the "claim"
made by the United States with regard to these findings was not properly before the Appellate Body because the United States failed to raise this issue in its Notice of Appeal, has also become moot.
67.
Therefore, the issue before us is whether, given these factual findings, the Panel erred in finding that the "financial contributions" bestowed on BSC could not be considered to confer a "benefit" on UES and BSplc/BSES. 57 We note that in our Report in Canada -Aircraft, we stated:
… the word "benefit", as used in Article 1.1(b), implies some kind of comparison. This must be so, for there can be no "benefit" to the recipient unless the "financial contribution" makes the recipient "better off" than it would otherwise have been, absent that contribution. In our view, the marketplace provides an appropriate basis for comparison in determining whether a "benefit" has been "conferred", because the trade-distorting potential of a "financial contribution" can be identified by determining whether the recipient has received a "financial contribution" on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market. 
68.
The question whether a "financial contribution" confers a "benefit" depends, therefore, on whether the recipient has received a "financial contribution" on terms more favourable than those available to the recipient in the market. In the present case, the Panel made factual findings that UES and BSplc/BSES paid fair market value for all the productive assets, goodwill, etc., they acquired from BSC and subsequently used in the production of leaded bars imported into the United States in 1994, 1995 and 1996. We, therefore, see no error in the Panel's conclusion that, in the specific circumstances of this case, the "financial contributions" bestowed on BSC between 1977 and 1986 could not be deemed to confer a "benefit" on UES and BSplc/BSES. supra, footnote 22, resolve the dispute between the parties. We do not agree with this characterization of our findings. In that appeal, India had argued that it was entitled to a finding by the Panel on each of the legal claims that it had made. We, however, found that the principle of judicial economy allows a panel to decline to rule on certain claims.
72.
In this case, the European Communities' claim is that the countervailing duties imposed on imports of leaded bars produced by UES and BSplc/BSES as a result of the 1995, 1996 and 1997 administrative reviews were inconsistent with the obligations of the United States under the SCM Agreement, and, in particular, with Articles 1.1(b), 10, 14 and 19.4 of that Agreement.
61
The European Communities relied upon two principal arguments in support of that claim. First, the European Communities argued that the USDOC was, in the circumstances of this case, required to examine whether there was any continuing "benefit" to UES and/or BSplc/BSES from the "financial contribution" to BSC. Second, the European Communities argued that, given that the USDOC had itself found that the sale of assets to UES and the privatization of BSC were arm's length transactions for fair market value, no benefit could have accrued to UES or BSplc/BSES.
73.
In order to resolve the claim of the European Communities, the Panel deemed it necessary to address the two principal arguments made in support of this claim. In doing so, the Panel acted within the context of resolving this particular dispute and, therefore, within the scope of its mandate under the DSU.
74.
On the basis of the above reasoning, we uphold the Panel's finding that, in the particular circumstances of this case, the USDOC should have examined in its 1995, 1996 and 1997 administrative reviews whether a "benefit" accrued to UES and BSplc/BSES following the changes in ownership; as well as the Panel's finding that, on the facts of this case, no "benefit" was conferred on UES or BSplc/BSES as a result of the "financial contributions" made to BSC.
VII. Findings and Conclusions
75.
For the reasons set out in this Report, the Appellate Body: whether a "benefit" accrued to UES and BSplc/BSES following the changes in ownership; and (c) upholds the Panel's finding, that, on the facts of this case, no "benefit" was conferred on UES or BSplc/BSES as a result of the "financial contributions" made to BSC.
76.
The Appellate Body recommends that the DSB request the United States to bring its measures found in the Panel Report, as upheld by this Report, to be inconsistent with its obligations under the SCM Agreement, into conformity with its obligations under that Agreement.
